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FREE SPEECH AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY BOOTSTRAPS 
Heidi Kitrosser* 
 
This Article focuses on two areas of national security exceptionalism in 
free speech doctrine:  judicial review of material-support laws as applied to 
speech and judicial responses to free speech defenses to prosecutions for 
leaking classified information.  While there are important differences 
between these two areas, they share one significant feature.  In both realms, 
courts engage in a very particular kind of “national security bootstrapping.”  
Specifically, courts effectively treat administrative designations—the 
decision to label a group a terrorist organization in one case and the decision 
to classify information in another—as means to bypass the rigorous judicial 
review to which related speech restrictions would otherwise be subjected. 
With respect to material-support laws, the U.S. Supreme Court has shown 
extraordinary deference to such laws as applied to speech “coordinated” 
with a designated “foreign terrorist organization” (FTO).  Were it not for 
the terrorist designation, courts would view such restrictions with the utmost 
skepticism.  With respect to classified information, courts have, in the handful 
of cases on the topic, reviewed prosecutions for leaking classified 
information with dramatically less rigor than they review restrictions on 
unclassified statements that the government deems dangerous.   
It is troubling that courts treat administrative designations—specifically, 
both FTO determinations and information classification—as bootstraps by 
which to yank speech restrictions from the clutches of probing judicial 
scrutiny.  This Article builds on existing scholarly critiques to identify and 
examine the common thread of national security bootstrapping that runs 
through both sets of cases.  The hope is that in so doing, some greater light 
may be shed both on the cases themselves and, more broadly, on the costs 
and benefits of judicial deference to executive national security claims where 
civil rights and civil liberties are at stake.  
 
 
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.  I am very grateful to Alex Tsesis 
and the Fordham Law Review students for organizing and inviting me to participate in the 
terrific symposium, entitled Terrorist Incitement on the Internet, for which I wrote this Article.  
The symposium was held at Fordham University School of Law.  For an overview, see 
Alexander Tsesis, Foreword:  Terrorist Incitement on the Internet, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 367 
(2017). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have debated whether and to what extent U.S. courts defer to the 
federal government more readily in the national security context than in other 
settings.1  Yet in the realm of information control, by which I mean 
government secrecy as well as efforts to suppress private speech, there are 
some clearly discernible pockets of national security exceptionalism.2  These 
pockets include the state secrets privilege,3 courts’ professed commitment to 
deferring more vigorously to executive privilege claims grounded in national 
security than in other rationales,4 and judicial reluctance to second-guess 
 
 1. See Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 
226–29, 231–33 (characterizing national security exceptionalism as a common descriptive 
assumption among scholars, yet citing differences of degree and kind between different 
versions of the assumption and ultimately challenging exceptionalism as empirically 
unsupported “in at least one important class of post-9/11 cases”).  
 2. See, e.g., Margaret B. Kwoka, The Procedural Exceptionalism of National Security 
Secrecy, 97 B.U. L. REV. 103, 107 (2017) (arguing that “courts exempt . . . national security 
secrecy claims from the typical procedural testing to determine their merit” and offering 
examples to support that claim). 
 3. See, e.g., id. at 117–25; HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY 94–100, 
117–22 (2015). 
 4. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710–11 (1974); United States v. 
Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 158 (D.D.C. 1990). 
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national security classifications in Freedom of Information Act litigation.5  
Free speech doctrine also contains enclaves of exceptionalism. 
This Article focuses on two areas of national security exceptionalism in 
free speech doctrine:  judicial review of material-support laws as applied to 
speech and judicial responses to free speech defenses that arise in 
prosecutions for leaking classified information.  While there are important 
differences between these two areas, they share one significant feature:  in 
both realms, courts engage in a very particular kind of “national security 
bootstrapping.”  Specifically, courts effectively treat administrative 
designations—the decision to label a group a terrorist organization in one 
case and the decision to classify information in another—as means to bypass 
the rigorous judicial review to which related speech restrictions would 
otherwise be subjected. 
With respect to material-support laws, the U.S. Supreme Court has shown 
extraordinary deference to such laws as applied to speech “coordinated” with 
a designated “foreign terrorist organization” (FTO).6  While the definition of 
“coordinated” remains unsettled, the Obama administration took the position 
that it extends to the writing of amicus briefs on behalf of FTOs.7  It could 
conceivably reach as far as the publishing of op-eds written by FTOs.8  Were 
it not for the terrorist designation, courts would view such restrictions with 
the utmost skepticism.9  With respect to classified information, courts have, 
in the handful of cases on the topic, reviewed prosecutions for leaking 
classified information with dramatically less rigor than they review 
restrictions on unclassified statements that the government deems 
dangerous.10 
It is troubling that courts treat administrative designations—specifically 
FTO determinations and information classification—as bootstraps by which 
to yank speech restrictions from the clutches of probing judicial scrutiny.  
Elsewhere, I and others have criticized judicial deference to the government 
in the context of leak prosecutions.11  And a number of commentators have 
been highly critical of material-support laws and of the Supreme Court’s 
deferential approach to them in the face of a free speech challenge.12  This 
Article builds on these critiques to identify and examine the common thread 
of national security bootstrapping that runs through both sets of cases.  The 
hope is that in so doing, some greater light may be shed both on the cases 
 
 5. See, e.g., Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets:  The Role Courts Should Play in 
Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 159–67 (2006).  
 6. See infra Part I.A.  
 7. See infra note 66.  
 8. See infra notes 67–69. 
 9. See infra Parts I.C, II.A. 
 10. See infra Part III.A. 
 11. See infra note 178 (citing several works in which I offer such criticisms); see also 
Mika C. Morse, Note, Honor or Betrayal? The Ethics of Government Lawyer-Whistleblowers, 
23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 421, 447 (2010) (making similar criticisms); Mary-Rose Papandrea, 
Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy:  National Security Leaks and the First Amendment, 94 
B.U. L. REV. 449, 464 (2014) (same). 
 12. See infra Part I.C. 
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themselves and, more broadly, on the costs and benefits of judicial deference 
to executive national security claims where civil rights and civil liberties are 
at stake. 
Parts I and II focus on material-support laws and the underlying 
mechanisms for designating FTOs and Specially Designated Global 
Terrorists (SDGTs).  Part I summarizes these authorities and explores the 
major, relevant judicial precedent and scholarly commentary.  Part II then 
builds on the existing scholarly critiques to argue that courts have, in 
material-support cases, adopted an ill-considered practice of bootstrapping 
that undermines longstanding principles of free speech doctrine and theory.  
Finally, Part III shifts gears to discuss prosecutions of classified information 
leaks and the system by which information is classified.13  There, I draw on 
my previous work on classified leak prosecutions and explain how 
bootstrapping occurs in that setting and why it poses problems similar to 
those posed in the material-support cases. 
I.  TERRORIST DESIGNATIONS AND MATERIAL-SUPPORT LAWS 
A.  Material Support of a Foreign Terrorist Organization 
1.  The Basic Legal Framework 
a.  The FTO Designation Process 
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the secretary of state 
may “designate an organization a foreign terrorist organization” if the 
secretary finds that the organization is foreign and that it “engages in terrorist 
activity . . . or terrorism” or “retains the capability and intent to engage in 
terrorist activity or terrorism” that “threatens the security of United States 
nationals or the national security of the United States.”14  “National security” 
refers to “the national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the 
United States,”15 and “terrorist activity” includes hijacking, kidnapping, 
assassination, using certain dangerous weapons, or threatening, attempting or 
conspiring to commit such acts.16  To “engage in terrorist activity” means to 
commit, incite to commit, prepare, or plan terrorist activity, or to support 
terrorist activity in other specified ways, including by “afford[ing] material 
support . . . to a terrorist organization.”17  Terrorism is defined as 
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”18 
 
 13. For a more in-depth treatment of classified information leak prosecutions and their 
First Amendment implications, see generally Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks 
and Free Speech, 3 U. ILL. L. REV. 881 (2008).  
 14. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2012).  
 15. Id. § 1189(d)(2). 
 16. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2012); id. § 1189(a)(1)(B). 
 17. Id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv); id. § 1189(a)(1)(B).  
 18. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(B).  
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The INA directs the secretary of state to make FTO determinations “in 
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General.”19  
It also requires the secretary of state to notify specified members of the Senate 
and House of Representatives, via “classified communication,” “[s]even days 
before making [an FTO] designation.”20  Seven days after providing this 
notice, the secretary must publish the FTO designation in the Federal 
Register,21 which takes effect upon publication.22  At that point, the secretary 
of the treasury is authorized to require U.S. financial institutions to freeze the 
FTO’s assets.23 
Publication in the Federal Register provides the only notice to which the 
FTO is entitled under the statutory scheme.24  The D.C. Circuit has, however, 
held that FTOs with property or other presence in the United States have a 
due process right to notice and an opportunity to submit written objections to 
the secretary of state prior their designation.25  Even in such cases, however, 
the government may bypass predesignation notice where the secretary makes 
“an adequate showing” that such notice “would impinge upon the security 
and other foreign policy goals of the United States.”26  FTOs without a 
presence in the United States have no constitutional right to predesignation 
notice.27 
Once a designation is published in the Federal Register, an FTO may, 
within thirty days of publication, seek review of the designation by the D.C. 
Circuit.28  That review, however, is “quite limited.”29  It is based solely on 
the administrative record.30  Classified portions of the record—to which the 
FTO “never has access”31—may be submitted “for ex parte and in camera 
review.”32  The court must reject designations that are “arbitrary, capricious,” 
or “an abuse of discretion,” unconstitutional or contrary to statute, or “lacking 
substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole or in 
classified information submitted to the court.”33  FTOs also may petition the 
 
 19. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(d)(4); see also id. § 1189(a)(1). 
 20. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 21. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
 22. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(B)(i). 
 23. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(C). 
 24. See Laura Donohue, Constitutional and Legal Challenges to the Anti-Terrorist 
Finance Regime, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 653 (2008); Brent Tunis, Note, Material-
Support-to-Terrorism Prosecutions:  Fighting Terrorism by Eroding Judicial Review, 49 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 269, 273–74 (2012). 
 25. Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State (NCRI), 251 F.3d 192, 200–03 
(D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Louisa C. Slocum, OFAC, the Department of State, and the Terrorist 
Designation Process:  A Comparative Analysis of Agency Discretion, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 387, 
403–04 (2013) (discussing the NCRI opinion). 
 26. NCRI, 251 F.3d at 208. 
 27. Slocum, supra note 25, at 403 (citing People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t 
of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
 28. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(1). 
 29. NCRI, 251 F.3d at 196. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 197. 
 32. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(2).  A panel of the D.C. Circuit observed that the record 
“generally” includes classified information. NCRI, 251 F.3d at 197. 
 33. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(3). 
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secretary biannually to have their designations removed.34  In addition, they 
may seek judicial review of petition denials, which would entail the same 
procedures and have the same scope as judicial review of initial 
designations.35 
b.  Material Support of an FTO 
It is a federal crime to provide “material support” to an FTO.36  Although 
a person must know that the organization is a designated FTO, one need not 
intend to further terrorism through his or her support of the FTO.37  Indeed, 
a person may engage in material support even if she subjectively intends, and 
reasonably acts, to steer the group away from terrorism or to further 
humanitarian ends through her support.38 
“Material support” means “any property . . . or service,” including “expert 
advice or assistance” or “personnel.”39  The only exceptions are for 
“medicine or religious materials.”40  “Training” is defined as “instruction or 
teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general 
knowledge,”41 and “expert advice or assistance” is defined to mean “advice 
or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge.”42  To be prosecuted for providing personnel, one must have 
“knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to provide [an FTO] 
with 1 or more individuals (who may be or include himself) to work under 
that terrorist organization’s direction or control.”43  If one works “entirely 
independently of the [FTO] to advance its goals or objectives,” that person 
“shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist 
organization’s direction and control.”44 
2.  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 
In 2010, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,45 the Supreme Court 
upheld the material-support law in the face of First Amendment and 
vagueness challenges.46  The plaintiffs were U.S. citizens and domestic 
organizations that wished to “provide support for the humanitarian and 
political activities” of two FTOs—the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (“PKK”) 
 
 34. Id. § 1189(a)(4). 
 35. Id. § 1189(c). 
 36. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 15–17 (2010); Wadie E. Said, 
Humanitarian Law Project and the Supreme Court’s Construction of Terrorism, 2011 BYU L. 
REV. 1455, 1492–93. 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4). 
 40. Id. §§ 2339A(b)(1), 2339B(g)(4). 
 41. Id. § 2339A(b)(2).  
 42. Id. §§ 2339B(g)(4), 2339A(b)(3). 
 43. Id. § 2339B(h). 
 44. Id. 
 45. 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 46. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 8 (2010). 
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and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil (“LTTE”).47  The plaintiffs sought, among 
other things, to train PKK members on “how to use humanitarian and 
international law to peacefully resolve disputes” and to teach “PKK members 
how to petition various representative bodies such as the United Nations for 
relief.”48  The Court agreed that these activities constituted expression and 
that the statute as applied to them had to be evaluated under some form of 
heightened scrutiny.49  Yet despite this formal invocation of something 
higher than intermediate scrutiny50—presumably meaning strict scrutiny, 
although the Court never used those words51—the Court effectively deferred 
deeply to the government’s claims.52 
The Court accepted the government’s view that even material support that 
is directed toward humanitarian, nonviolent ends—as in plaintiffs’ proposed 
efforts to teach PKK members how to engage in peaceful dispute resolution 
and to petition groups such as the United Nations for relief—could facilitate 
an FTO’s terrorist activities.53  Such support, the government argued and the 
Court agreed, could free up resources that the FTO might then divert toward 
terrorism.54  It also could enhance FTOs’ legitimacy, thus “mak[ing] it easier 
for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds—all of 
which facilitate more terrorist attacks.”55  Finally, such support “furthers 
terrorism by straining the United States’ relationships with its allies and 
undermining cooperative efforts between nations to prevent terrorist 
attacks.”56 
The Court’s assessment of these points was underscored by extraordinary 
deference to Congress and the executive branch.  The Court repeatedly 
stressed two considerations:  the relative expertise of the political branches 
in the realms of national security and foreign relations57 and the 
 
 47. Id. at 8–10. 
 48. Id. at 14–15. 
 49. Id. at 28.  
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 16, 19–20 (2012) (citing this aspect of the court’s analysis); Said, 
supra note 38, at 1498–99 (same). 
 52. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Terrorism and Associations, 63 EMORY L.J. 581, 589 
(2014) (deeming the Humanitarian Law Project decision’s “deferential posture in the context 
of heightened scrutiny . . . inconsistent with most modern law”); Huq, supra note 51, at 25 
(describing Humanitarian Law Project’s “version of strict scrutiny” as “strikingly forgiving”); 
Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism:  Material Support, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of 
Speech, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 455, 496 (2012) (“[T]he opinion displays a deference to the 
government’s claims that is both unnecessary to the decision and inconsistent with the 
heightened scrutiny that the Court adopts.”); Aaron Tuley, Note, Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project:  Redefining Free Speech Protection in the War on Terror, 49 IND. L. REV. 579, 601 
(2016) (“Although the majority in Humanitarian Law Project stated that it was 
applying . . . the strict scrutiny standard, it did not . . . apply it correctly.”). 
 53. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 33–36. 
 54. Id. at 29–30. 
 55. Id. at 30. 
 56. Id. at 32. 
 57. See id. at 33–34 (stating that “evaluation of the facts by the Executive, like Congress’s 
assessment, is entitled to deference” given the relative expertise of each and that “[i]t is vital 
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reasonableness of those branches’ judgments in this case.58  The latter 
element made the Court’s reasoning appear to be closer to rational basis 
review than to strict scrutiny, with the Court suggesting that the government 
must prevail so long as its concerns could not reasonably be ruled out.  For 
instance, the Court criticized the dissent for being “unwilling to entertain the 
prospect that training and advising a designated foreign terrorist organization 
on how to take advantage of international entities might benefit that 
organization in a way that facilitates its terrorist activities.”59 
The plaintiffs’ vagueness claims were also unsuccessful.  The plaintiffs 
had argued that they wished to advocate on behalf of the PKK and the LTTE.  
The statute prohibits advocacy “performed in coordination with, or at the 
direction of, a foreign terrorist organization,”60 but it does not restrict 
“independent advocacy.”61  The plaintiffs protested that this distinction was 
too vague to tell them whether their intended advocacy was prohibited, but 
the Court declined to address this claim.62  According to the Court, the 
plaintiffs had not adequately specified “the degree to which they seek to 
coordinate their advocacy with the PKK and LTTE.”63  The Court also 
rejected plaintiffs’ vagueness challenges regarding planned teaching and 
training activities because, in the Court’s view, the statute plainly 
encompassed those activities.64 
Although the Court never clearly delineated the distinction between 
“independent” and “coordinated” speech, it emphasized the distinction’s 
significance.  Indeed, to the Court, the distinction helped to mitigate First 
Amendment concerns about the statute.65  The distinction’s importance, and 
the uncertainty surrounding its meaning, was evident throughout the 
Humanitarian Law Project litigation.  During oral argument before the 
Supreme Court, for example, then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan said that 
the Obama administration would consider it material support to file an 
amicus brief “for” an FTO but not to do so independently in support of a 
position favorable to an FTO.66  At the same oral argument, plaintiffs’ 
attorney David Cole pointed out that the New York Times, Washington Post, 
and Los Angeles Times have all published op-eds by spokespersons for 
Hamas, which is an FTO.67  Each news organization, Cole argued, might 
have violated the material-support law by having “coordinated with the 
 
in this context ‘not to substitute . . . our own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation 
by the Legislative Branch’” (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981))). 
 58. See id. at 36 (“At bottom, plaintiffs simply disagree with the considered judgment of 
Congress and the Executive . . . .  That judgment, however, is entitled to significant weight, 
and we have persuasive evidence before us to sustain it.”). 
 59. Id. at 38. 
 60. Id. at 24. 
 61. Id. at 23. 
 62. Id. at 24–25. 
 63. Id. at 25. 
 64. Id. at 22–23.  
 65. Id. at 24–26, 31–32, 35–36, 39–40. 
 66. Transcript of Oral Argument at 46–47, Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (No. 
08-1498). 
 67. See id. at 13–14. 
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Hamas spokesperson in editing and accepting and then publishing his 
editorial.”68  Justice Antonin Scalia responded that “[i]t depends on what 
coordinating means,” which “we can determine . . . in the next case.”69 
3.  Post-Humanitarian Law Project Developments 
Since Humanitarian Law Project, little judicial light has been shed on the 
line between independent and coordinated speech.  The most relevant 
decision is United States v. Mehanna,70 a 2013 opinion by the First Circuit.  
In Mehanna, the prosecution alleged two bases for violation of the material-
support statute:  the defendant Tarek Mehanna’s unsuccessful efforts to find 
and join a terrorist training camp in Yemen and his translating of Arab-
language materials into English.71  “[A]t least some” of the materials 
“constituted [Al Qaeda]-generated media and materials supportive of [Al 
Qaeda] and/or jihad,” and Mehanna posted them on At-Tibyan, “a 
website . . . for those sympathetic to [Al Qaeda] and Salafi-Jihadi 
perspectives.”72  The jury returned a general verdict convicting Mehanna on 
all counts, but Mehanna appealed on the ground that his translations 
constituted independently made protected speech, and that the verdict might 
have been based on the protected translations.73  The First Circuit rejected 
Mehanna’s challenge.  In its view, the trial court acted appropriately in 
advising the jury that it “need not worry about . . . the First Amendment” 
because the material-support statute already accommodates it by punishing 
only coordinated speech.74  Nor did the judge err in “treat[ing] the question 
of whether enough coordination existed to criminalize [Mehanna’s] 
translations as fact-bound and [leaving] that question to the jury.”75  
Moreover, the court declined to consider Mehanna’s contention that there 
was insufficient evidence to characterize his translations as coordinated 
speech because his “Yemen trip supplied an independently sufficient 
evidentiary predicate for the convictions.”76 
In a sense, Mehanna does not add very much to our understanding of the 
line between independent and coordinated speech.  The relevant jury 
instruction, of which the First Circuit approved, largely echoed the material-
support statute and the Humanitarian Law Project majority opinion in 
informing jurors that the statute punishes only FTO-directed or coordinated 
speech and not independent advocacy.77  And the First Circuit simply did not 
 
 68. Id. at 14–15. 
 69. Id. at 15; cf. Marjorie Heins, The Supreme Court and Political Speech in the 21st 
Century:  The Implications of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 76 ALA. L. REV. 561, 588 
(2013) (recounting examples cited by plaintiffs and government throughout the litigation to 
demonstrate potential breadth of prohibited advocacy). 
 70. 735 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 71. Id. at 41–42.  
 72. Id. at 41. 
 73. Id. at 47. 
 74. Id. at 48–49.   
 75. Id. at 49. 
 76. Id. at 50. 
 77. Id. at 48.  
518 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
weigh in on whether the translation-related evidence sufficed to show 
direction or coordination.78 
Yet Mehanna does demonstrate the potential for expansive prosecutorial 
interpretations of coordinated advocacy and for judicial permissiveness 
regarding the same.  The United States did not allege that the defendant 
translated materials directly for Al Qaeda.  It alleged, rather, that he provided 
translations to a website that supported Al Qaeda ideologically, hoped to 
spread its message, and sometimes took translation requests from members 
of Al Qaeda.79  The United States further alleged that Mehanna himself 
hoped to aid Al Qaeda through his translations.80  Among the acts that the 
government deemed material support in its indictment were conspiring to 
“create like-minded youth in the Boston area”81 and translating a text entitled 
“39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad.”82  While the United States thus 
attempted to show some kind of working relationship between Mehanna and 
Al Qaeda, it alleged no more than an indirect relationship through a 
website.83  More broadly, the prosecution suggested a view of coordination 
expansive enough to encompass unilateral efforts to convince others of the 
rightness of an FTO’s cause.84 
At the same time, there is some post-Humanitarian Law Project evidence 
that the coordination requirement is not utterly toothless.  Shortly after 
Humanitarian Law Project was decided, a district court dismissed a claim 
against defendants Council on American-Islamic Relations and Council on 
American-Islamic Relations–Canada (collectively “CAIR”).85  That case 
involved a civil lawsuit against the defendants for providing criminal material 
 
 78. Id. at 50; see also Marty Lederman, Avoidance of the First Amendment Questions in 
the Mehanna Case, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 14, 2013) https://www.justsecurity.org/3174/ 
avoidance-amendment-questions-mehanna-case/ [https://perma.cc/M5K5-GSMA] 
(concluding that the First Circuit “avoided resolution of any constitutional questions”). 
 79. See Brief for the United States in Opposition at 5, 16, Mehanna v. United States, 135 
S. Ct. 49 (2014) (No. 13-1125); cf. Benjamin Wittes, David Cole and Peter Margulies:  An 
Exchange on Tarek Mehanna, LAWFARE (Apr. 22, 2012), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/david-cole-and-peter-margulies-exchange-tarek-mehanna 
[https://perma.cc/A36E-R8RE] (excerpting competing evaluations by David Cole and Peter 
Margulies of government’s coordination evidence). 
 80. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 5, 16, Mehanna, 135 S. Ct. 49 (No. 13-
1125). 
 81. Second Superseding Indictment ¶ 5, United States v. Mehanna, 669 F. Supp. 2d 160 
(D. Mass. 2009) (No. 09-CR-10017-GAO). 
 82. Id. ¶ 21.  A commentator later deemed this translation “[t]he centerpiece of the 
government’s case against Mr. Mehanna’s speech activities.” See Andrew F. March, A 
Dangerous Mind?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/ 
opinion/sunday/a-dangerous-mind.html [https://perma.cc/9LQH-MDGM]. 
 83. See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 52, at 601 (“Mehanna was prosecuted . . . despite the 
lack of any evidence that he had direct contact with an FTO.”); Wittes, supra note 79 (citing 
a similar view by David Cole in response to Peter Marguiles’ defense of the government’s 
position in Mehanna). 
 84. See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 52, at 610 (arguing that the proceedings in Mehanna 
“suggest[] that coordination/membership can be unilateral”); George D. Brown, Notes on a 
Terrorism Trial—Preventive Prosecution, “Material Support” and the Role of the Judge After 
United States v. Mehanna, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 1, 25–26 (2012) (explaining that the 
prosecution’s approach lends itself to a very open-ended interpretation of “coordination”). 
 85. In re:  Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 740 F. Supp. 2d 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
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support to Al Qaeda.86  Plaintiffs alleged that CAIR, through “‘PSYOPS’ 
(psychological operations), ‘disinformation activities,’ and propaganda 
campaigns,” sought—in furtherance of the goals of Hamas, another FTO—
to “legitimize the activities of Islamic militants and neutralize opposition to 
Islamic extremism, and thereby serve as ‘perception management’ in support 
of Al Qaeda.”87  The court noted the absence of any alleged ties between 
CAIR and Al Qaeda beyond ideological agreement.88  It explained that 
“[m]erely because the services defendants allegedly provide are beneficial to 
terrorist organizations generally who share the same radical and ideological 
views as Hamas, does not expose defendants to liability for any act of 
terrorism committed by another one of those organizations.”89 
Humanitarian Law Project and subsequent cases also demonstrate the 
range of speech that, if coordinated, is punishable as material support.  
Humanitarian Law Project itself involved the teaching of peaceful conflict 
resolution and of how to petition groups such as the United Nations for 
relief.90  Mehanna concerned translating and posting documents.91  And 
while the court in In re:  Terrorist Attacks dismissed the claim against CAIR, 
it declined to do the same for a claim against World Assembly of Muslim 
Youth (WAMY).92  The allegations against WAMY included that it “uses its 
publications, youth camps, Islamic Centers, mosques conferences and other 
sponsored events, to provide ideological foundation for the Al Qaeda 
movement.”93  Citing Humanitarian Law Project, the court explained that 
“[e]stablishing meeting places, holding public forums, or issuing 
publications to disseminate virulent rhetoric is not actionable . . . unless such 
services are being provided as support to a foreign terrorist organization.”94 
As In re:  Terrorist Attacks illustrates, the criminal material-support laws 
have given rise not only to prosecutions but also to derivative civil lawsuits 
filed by plaintiffs allegedly injured by FTOs.  The plaintiffs in these cases 
have sued social media companies, including Facebook and Twitter, for 
providing criminal material support to FTOs by allowing them to obtain 
accounts.95  While some of the allegations in the lawsuits likely pertain to 
constitutionally unprotected speech by the FTOs, many of them pertain to 
 
 86. Id. at 504–05, 515–16. 
 87. Id. at 518. 
 88. Id. at 518–19. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 22 (2010). 
 91. United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 92. In re:  Terrorist Attacks, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 519–20. 
 93. Id. at 519. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See, e.g., KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., R44626, THE ADVOCACY 
OF TERRORISM ON THE INTERNET:  FREEDOM OF SPEECH ISSUES AND THE MATERIAL SUPPORT 
STATUTES 6 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44626.pdf [https://perma.cc/76RZ-D7YW] 
(discussing the lawsuits); Benjamin Wittes & Zoe Bedell, Facebook, Hamas, and Why a New 
Material Support Suit May Have Legs, LAWFARE (July 12, 2016), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/facebook-hamas-and-why-new-material-support-suit-may-
have-legs [https://perma.cc/8UWU-XHXF] (“The last few months have seen a spree of 
lawsuits filed against social media companies for allegedly providing material support to 
terrorists . . . by effectively allowing those groups to use their systems.”). 
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FTO speech—such as broadly disseminated propaganda—that would be 
protected outside of the material-support context.96  Courts thus far have held 
that the Communications Decency Act (CDA) immunizes these service 
providers from such lawsuits,97 but it seems unlikely, in light of 
Humanitarian Law Project, that courts would deem the First Amendment to 
protect the providers should other courts interpret the CDA differently, or 
should Congress amend it.  Indeed, in a pre-Humanitarian Law Project case, 
a federal district court rejected a First Amendment defense from a satellite 
television programming provider in New York for retransmitting the signal 
of “Al Manar, a television station associated with . . . Hezbollah,” an FTO.98  
The defendant in that case, Javaid Iqbal, eventually pled guilty to material 
support and was sentenced to sixty-nine months in prison.99 
B.  Specially Designated Global Terrorists 
Beyond the INA, the government has a yet more flexible set of tools at its 
disposal to punish speech activities as terrorist support.  Under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977, the 
president may declare a national emergency with respect to an “unusual and 
extraordinary threat, which has its origin in whole or in substantial part 
outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or 
economy.”100  Upon doing so, the president gains the authority to 
“investigate, block assets and prohibit transactions with designated 
persons”101 in order to “deal with [that] threat.”102 
 
 96. See, e.g., Fields v. Twitter, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1119, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2016) 
(summarizing FTO Twitter activity about which plaintiffs complain, ranging from direct 
recruitment messages to “instructional guidelines,” “promotional videos,” and “propaganda”). 
 97. Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., No. 16-CV-4453, 2017 WL 2192621, at *10–13 (E.D.N.Y. 
May 18, 2017); Fields, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1118, 1123–24; see also Russell Spivak, Facebook 
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Dist. of N.Y., Staten Island Man Sentenced to Sixty-Nine Months in Prison for Providing 
Material Support and Resources to Hizballah (Apr. 23, 2009), https://archives.fbi.gov/ 
archives/newyork/press-releases/2009/nyfo042309a.htm [https://perma.cc/F8TB-38H7]. 
 100. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2012). 
 101. See id. § 1702; Anti-Money Laundering:  Blocking Terrorist Financing & Its Impact 
on Lawful Charities:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 5–21 (2010) [hereinafter Anti-Money Laundering Hearing] 
(statement of Daniel L. Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and 
Financial Crimes, U.S. Department of the Treasury). 
 102. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(b). 
2017] NATIONAL SECURITY BOOTSTRAPS 521 
Pursuant to IEEPA and other authorities, President George W. Bush issued 
Executive Order 13,224 (“EO 13,224”) shortly after September 11, 2001.103  
In the order, President Bush declared a national emergency, designated 
twenty-seven Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs), and 
authorized the blocking of SDGTs’ assets.104  EO 13,224 also provided 
means for additional SDGT designations to be made.  Among other things, it 
empowered the secretary of the treasury, in consultation with the secretary of 
state and the attorney general, to designate as SDGTs persons who provide 
material support for, or who are “otherwise associated with,” other 
SDGTs.105  In other words, “[m]ere association—quite apart from 
demonstrated material support—is sufficient” to designate a target an SDGT 
and to freeze its assets.106  The treasury department has since taken the 
position that it need have only reasonable suspicion of association or material 
support to justify designation.107 
Upon designating a person or entity an SDGT, the treasury department 
freezes its assets.108  The department also has discretion, under the USA 
PATRIOT Act,109 to freeze assets upon initiating an investigation into a 
potential designee.110  A designated or potential SDGT may apply to the 
treasury department for a license to use blocked funds for specified 
transactions, such as to pay lawyers’ fees.111 
Despite EO 13,224’s post-September 11 origin, it does not “contain any 
limiting language restricting it to the entities who committed the 9/11 
attacks.”112  EO 13,224 is instead “a global order that [applies] generally to 
‘foreign terrorists’” and their supporters and associates.113  Indeed, the 
national emergency declared in the order has been renewed every year since 
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the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 4–6, 19–20 (2005) (providing background 
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2001 and therefore has been active for nearly seventeen years.114  As of late 
2016, more than 950 persons and entities had been designated as SDGTs.115 
Courts engage in “highly deferential review[s]” of SDGT 
determinations.116  As administrative decisions, they are reviewed under the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard,117 and “[c]ourts are particularly mindful 
that their review is highly deferential when matters of foreign policy and 
national security are concerned.”118  Furthermore, courts have held that 
SDGTs’ due process demands are satisfied by “a post-deprivation 
administrative remedy and the opportunity to submit written submissions to 
[the treasury department],” and that SDGTs are entitled neither to the 
classified evidence on which the executive relied in designating them nor to 
“procedures which approximate a judicial trial.”119 
Since Humanitarian Law Project, only one court has spoken in depth about 
the SDGT system’s First Amendment implications.  In Al Haramain Islamic 
Foundation v. U.S. Department of the Treasury,120 the Ninth Circuit 
addressed a free speech challenge by the Multicultural Association of 
Southern Oregon (MCASO) to section 2(a) of EO 13,224, which prohibits 
U.S. persons or entities from providing “services to or for the benefit of” any 
SDGTs.121  MCASO challenged section 2(a) as applied to its planned 
“advocacy coordinated with and for the benefit of” Al Haramain Islamic 
Foundation, Oregon (“AHIF Oregon”), a designated SDGT.122  Among other 
things, MCASO alleged that it wished to “speak to the press, hold 
demonstrations, and contact the government,” all in coordination with AHIF 
Oregon.123 
“For purposes of the First Amendment analysis,” the court discerned “no 
difference between section 2(a) of EO 13,224 and the statute at issue in 
[Humanitarian Law Project].”124  It thus concluded that strict scrutiny 
applies, as it had (at least theoretically) in Humanitarian Law Project.125  Yet 
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in applying strict scrutiny, the court found the case materially distinguishable 
from Humanitarian Law Project, in large part because of AHIF Oregon’s 
status as a domestic organization.  The court found “little evidence that the 
pure-speech activities proposed by MCASO on behalf of the domestic branch 
[of AHIF Oregon] will aid the larger international organization’s sinister 
purposes,” and concluded that EO 13,224 could not constitutionally be 
applied.126  Al Haramain signals, on the one hand, that First Amendment 
claims likely will fail, as in Humanitarian Law Project, insofar as they 
challenge the SDGT framework as applied to speech coordinated with 
foreign SDGTs.  On the other hand, the Al Haramain decision suggests an 
important limit on Humanitarian Law Project’s reach—speech is relatively 
likely to be protected, at least in the Ninth Circuit, when it is coordinated with 
domestic SDGTs.127 
C.  Existing Critiques of Humanitarian Law Project, 
Material-Support Laws, and Designation Processes 
A number of thoughtful critiques of Humanitarian Law Project have been 
penned in the seven-plus years since it was decided.  The most elemental 
criticism raised is that aspects of the case fly in the face of well-established 
precedent.  Several writers observe that the Court, in deferring so heavily to 
the government, acted incompatibly with the strict scrutiny standard that it 
purported to apply.128  Others suggest that the Court’s reasoning runs counter 
to incitement doctrine and particularly to Brandenburg v. Ohio,129 the 
landmark 1969 case.130  Under Brandenburg, speakers cannot be penalized 
for inciting violence unless they intend to and are likely to cause imminent 
unlawful activity.131  Furthermore, some scholars deem Humanitarian Law 
Project’s reasoning incompatible with free association precedent.  In 
particular, they argue that under Scales v. United States,132 speakers cannot 
be punished for coordinating with terrorist groups unless they specifically 
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intend to further a group’s unlawful ends.133  Many, though not all,134 of these 
First Amendment-based critiques take aim not only at Humanitarian Law 
Project but also at the material-support laws themselves. 
Some scholars agree with the Humanitarian Law Project Court that speech 
coordinated with FTOs ought not to be protected but voice concerns about 
important aspects of the Court’s reasoning.  For example, Peter Margulies 
argues that the basic distinction between (unprotected) coordinated speech 
and (protected) independent advocacy is justified.135  Such a distinction 
provides a safe harbor for independent speech, while allowing the 
government needed flexibility to fight foreign terrorists who would exploit 
information asymmetries between themselves and U.S. persons with whom 
they might coordinate.136  Yet Margulies faults the Humanitarian Law 
Project Court on several fronts, including for deferring excessively to the 
government, for using ambiguous language that could be taken to condone 
punishing speakers who lend ideological legitimacy to FTOs, and for leaving 
uncertain the distinction between independent and coordinated advocacy.137 
Ashutosh Bhagwat makes a somewhat parallel set of arguments about 
associational freedoms.138  There is a legally significant distinction between 
coordinated and uncoordinated speech, he argues, because coordinated 
speech triggers associational protections rather than speech protections, and 
associational rights extend only to peaceable groups.139  Nonetheless, 
Bhagwat takes issue with much of the Humanitarian Law Project Court’s 
reasoning.140  Like Margulies, Bhagwat laments the murkiness of the line 
between coordinated and uncoordinated speech.141  Bhagwat points to 
Mehanna—in which “coordination was alleged and allowed to go to the jury 
based on the defendant’s actions alone, taken in response to a general plea 
from an FTO”142—as a troubling product of that uncertainty.143 
Beyond critiquing Humanitarian Law Project, a number of scholars and 
advocates have examined the material-support laws and the FTO and SDGT 
designation and enforcement processes more broadly.  For example, critics 
long have raised due process concerns regarding many aspects of the 
designation procedures.  These include the government’s use of classified 
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2017] NATIONAL SECURITY BOOTSTRAPS 525 
evidence to which designees lack access; the limited scope of the 
administrative and judicial review opportunities provided designees to 
challenge their status; and the government’s ability to seize potential SDGTs’ 
assets upon initiating investigations, which forces groups to seek government 
permission to fund their own defenses.144 
Critics have also challenged the implementation of designation and 
material-support provisions as discriminatory.  For example, Laura Donohue 
wrote in 2008 that both the FTO and SDGT frameworks have “had a disparate 
impact on the Arab Muslim community”145 and that, “while some Arab or 
Muslim organizations do threaten U.S. interests, there is reason to believe 
that this threat has been greatly exaggerated.”146  At the same time, she 
observed that “many other organizations, which do pose a threat to U.S. 
national security—and are neither Arab nor Muslim—have escaped the more 
onerous provisions in the anti-terrorist finance regime.”147  Michael German 
of the ACLU offered striking evidence of such double standards while 
testifying before Congress in 2010: 
[I]n contrast to the treatment of U.S.-based Muslim charities, Chiquita 
Brands International was allowed to pay a fine of $25 million following its 
payment of $1.7 million directly to two designated terrorist groups in 
Colombia between 1997 and 2004.  Chiquita admitted to these payments in 
2003, but no criminal charges were filed, its assets were never seized or 
frozen, and Chiquita continues to operate.  In another example, [the 
treasury department] has never designated Halliburton or General Electric, 
or frozen their assets, despite both companies’ conduct of business with 
Iran, which is designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.  Former Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury Paul Craig Roberts, who served under President 
Ronald Reagan, observed, “I think the attack on the Muslim charities was 
just easy, it was an easy, soft target.”148 
II.  ON DESIGNATIONS, BOOTSTRAPS, 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A.  FTO & SDGT Designations 
as Bootstraps to Bypass Precedent 
Critics of Humanitarian Law Project are correct that the case deviates 
markedly from precedents central to modern free speech doctrine.  It is a 
cornerstone of that doctrine that speakers cannot be punished for inciting 
 
 144. See, e.g., Anti-Money Laundering Hearing, supra note 101, at 42 (written statement 
of Michael German, Policy Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union) (“IEEPA effectively 
allows the government to shut down an organization forever, without notice or hearing, on the 
basis of secret evidence, and without any meaningful judicial review.”); Donohue, supra note 
24, at 663 (concluding that “[t]he designation process for SDGTs and FTOs expands executive 
authority without providing even rudimentary procedural due process protections” and citing 
the concerns listed in the text accompanying this footnote, among others). 
 145. Donohue, supra note 24, at 672. 
 146. Id. at 675. 
 147. Id. at 676. 
 148. Anti-Money Laundering Hearing, supra note 101, at 44 (written statement of Michael 
German, Policy Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). 
526 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
violence unless the exacting Brandenburg standard, or genuine strict 
scrutiny, is met.149  And the Court’s reliance on the concept of coordination 
only worsens matters.  As Mehanna illustrates, the definition currently is so 
open ended that it enables unilaterally undertaken speech to be penalized.150  
More so, the definition’s haziness and potential breadth surely chill 
prospective speakers.151  Nor is a highly clarifying definition likely to be 
forthcoming, given the Supreme Court’s refusal to decide facial vagueness 
challenges or to consider insufficiently detailed, as-applied preenforcement 
challenges.152 
More fundamentally, Humanitarian Law Project employs the concept of 
coordination in a manner that belies both speech and association precedents.  
To the Humanitarian Law Project Court, coordinated speech is a speech-plus 
of sorts, to which ordinary speech protections do not apply with full force.153  
Nor does such speech receive associational protections.  The latter cover 
“membership,” whereas coordinated speech is more akin to membership-
plus-speech.154  Coordination, in short, is neither pure membership nor pure 
speech but a combination of both.  Under Humanitarian Law Project, rather 
than this combination warranting protections at least as strong as—if not 
stronger than—those that apply to individual speech,155 the combination 
leads to substantially diminished protections.156  This approach rests on a 
tautology:  the bar on coordinated speech does not raise the same First 
Amendment issues as would restrictions on “mere membership” or “pure 
political speech” because coordinated speech is neither of those things.  
Instead, it is something called “material support,” and material support 
receives less protection.157 
The concepts of material support and coordinated speech, and 
Humanitarian Law Project’s deferential approaches to both, are grounded in 
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the FTO designation system.  The Court stressed in Humanitarian Law 
Project that the material-support law “only applies to [FTOs],”158 that 
Congress and the executive branch believe that FTOs are “so tainted by their 
criminal conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates that 
conduct,”159 and that deference to this judgment is “vital” given the political 
branches’ relative expertise.160  Most important, the Court accepted that the 
taint of an FTO’s status infects not only that FTO but also others who speak 
with it or on its behalf.161  The infection transforms their coordinated speech 
into something different and constitutionally lesser than “pure” speech or 
association.162 
By accepting the notion that FTO status is so transformative, both for the 
FTO and for speech coordinated with it, Humanitarian Law Project 
effectively uses FTO status as a bootstrap.  With that strap, it yanks criminal 
penalties for speech past the skeptical judicial analyses that precedent would 
otherwise demand.  SDGT designations similarly serve as bootstraps—albeit, 
according to the Ninth Circuit, with respect only to foreign SDGTs.163 
I do not mean to suggest that existing doctrinal standards ought not be 
adjusted to address certain clearly defined instances of coordinated speech.  
In a different context—that of prosecuting publications of classified 
information—I have argued that a slight softening of Brandenburg’s 
imminence requirement might be appropriate, as damage from such 
publication can take time to manifest.164  A similar argument might be made 
about speech undertaken in close coordination with certain terrorist groups 
because globally dispersed, well-resourced groups may lay and carry out 
plans slowly but steadily over time through cells.165  Indeed, the plaintiffs in 
Humanitarian Law Project themselves maintained that the Court could 
resolve any constitutional problems simply by interpreting the material-
support statute to require specific intent.166 
Yet while there is room for reasonable argument about the details of the 
ideal legal standard, such a standard should, as elaborated below, be 
searching and skeptical.  Moreover, whatever its particulars, it should be 
arrived at only after careful consideration of the speech interests at stake; the 
blind spots, biases, and relative advantages of the political branches; and the 
relevant existing precedent.  The Court failed in Humanitarian Law Project 
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to grapple with these factors in any meaningful way.  Instead, it simply 
bypassed them, using as bootstraps the FTO system and the government’s 
judgments regarding the impact of FTO status on coordinated speech.  In so 
doing, the Court presented the political branches’ national security judgments 
as nearly unquestionable, the speech values at issue as minor, and its own 
deferential posture as unremarkable—and even compatible with strict 
scrutiny. 
B.  The Trouble with Bootstrapping 
In bootstrapping past rigorous judicial review in Humanitarian Law 
Project, the Court bypassed not just doctrine but core insights of the free 
speech theory that animate it.  Perhaps the most widely embraced such insight 
is that speech about government and politics is deeply valued under the First 
Amendment for its essential contributions to the project of self-
government.167  Also central is the notion that there is a high potential for 
incompetence and abuse of power where the government seeks to pick 
winners and losers among speakers based on the content of their speech.168  
Indeed, there is special reason to fear abuse in the realm of public affairs 
where government actors are most likely to have professional and 
reputational investments at stake.169 
The material-support context illustrates the special value of speech 
regarding public affairs and the special risks of suppressing it.  Even putting 
aside the serious due process concerns that have been raised about FTO and 
SDGT designation procedures,170 it is indisputable that the executive 
possesses very broad discretion to make those designations.  That discretion 
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can be exercised by, among other things, bootstrapping from prior 
determinations that are themselves acts of broad decision-making discretion.  
For example, the executive may designate a group an FTO on the basis that 
it materially supported another FTO.171  Parallel criteria exist in the SDGT 
context.172  The very existence of the SDGT category itself rests on a strained 
executive interpretation of the underlying statutory authority173 and on 
repeated presidential renewals of a state of emergency characterized by an 
“unusual and extraordinary threat” over the course of seventeen years.174 
The executive’s wide discretion to designate FTOs and SDGTs, combined 
with its broad enforcement leeway regarding material-support prosecutions 
and blocking orders, also makes it likely that political considerations and 
other biases will influence decision-making.  Recall, for example, concerns 
voiced to the effect that Muslim charities and organizations have been 
disproportionately targeted while other groups’ serious transgressions are 
overlooked or treated relatively leniently.175 
It is especially dangerous, from the perspective of free speech theory, for 
the executive to direct such discretion against material support that takes the 
form of speech.  With such power, the executive can readily manipulate 
public debate about designated groups, the designation process itself, or 
related matters.  The rights of individuals and groups to speak to or on behalf 
of FTOs and SDGTs are valuable counterweights against potential abuses or 
incompetence by the government.  And it does not suffice to leave only 
limited avenues, such as the ability to engage in independent speech, 
available.  Courts repeatedly, and with good reason, have rejected the notion 
that government has wide latitude to limit speakers’ expressive or 
associational choices.  Indeed, Justice Scalia, writing for a majority of the 
Court, famously rejected the argument that legislatures could freely draw 
content-based restrictions even within categories of “unprotected speech,” 
citing such restrictions’ skewing effect on public discourse176 and the risk 
that they amount to “official suppression of ideas.”177 
III.  BOOTSTRAPPING IN ANOTHER SETTING:  
PROSECUTING LEAKS OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 
The use of administrative designations as national security bootstraps is 
not peculiar to the material-support setting.  The executive branch and the 
courts similarly treat information-classification decisions as bootstraps with 
which to pull prosecutions for leaking classified information past the 
intensive judicial scrutiny that would otherwise apply.  Elsewhere, I have 
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discussed classified information leak prosecutions and their First 
Amendment implications in great detail.178  Here, I take a more abbreviated 
look at the topic to illustrate how bootstrapping takes place in this setting and 
poses First Amendment problems similar to those posed in the material-
support context. 
A.  Judicial and Executive Branch Positions 
on Leaks and the First Amendment 
Although the United States lacks an official-secrets act that automatically 
criminalizes classified information leaks, it has a patchwork of laws that 
come close to having that effect.179  Through these laws, particularly the 
Espionage Act,180 the executive is empowered to prosecute government 
employees or other insiders for conveying virtually any classified 
information without authorization, including information conveyed to 
journalists.181 
Only one federal appellate court, the Fourth Circuit, has considered a First 
Amendment challenge to an Espionage Act prosecution for leaking 
information to the press.  In United States v. Morison,182 authored by Judge 
Donald Russell and joined by Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, the court took the 
view that the defendant, who transmitted classified satellite photos to a 
magazine for publication, had engaged in pure theft and that “no First 
Amendment rights [were] implicated” by his prosecution.183  Both Judge 
Wilkinson and Judge James Phillips, the panel’s third judge, wrote separate 
concurring opinions expressing the view, contra the majority opinion, that 
the prosecution implicated the First Amendment.184  However, although 
neither identified the precise standard that it would employ, each concurrence 
supported a deferential role for the judiciary.185  The handful of district court 
cases addressing First Amendment challenges to Espionage Act prosecutions 
follow Morison’s lead in embracing a very minimal role for judicial 
review.186 
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For its part, the executive branch has, in the smattering of leak prosecutions 
undertaken across administrations, consistently taken the view reflected in 
Morison’s majority opinion that classified information is government 
property and its conveyance is theft, not speech.  It has argued, in short, that 
there simply are no First Amendment issues raised by leak prosecutions.187 
The judicial and executive branch positions very much rely on the 
information classification system and on particular classification decisions as 
bootstraps to drag leak prosecutions past the challenging judicial scrutiny that 
would otherwise apply.  Indeed, as we saw in the material-support context, 
the Brandenburg standard ordinarily applies to speech prosecutions based on 
potential harm to national security.188  Under Brandenburg, such speech can 
be punished only if the speaker intended to and if her speech is imminently 
likely to spark illegal behavior.189  Nor are government employers entitled, 
outside of the classified information context, to strip employees of all First 
Amendment protections for conveying information about which they signed 
confidentiality agreements.190  Even where an employee’s penalty is 
confined to her employment terms—such as termination or demotion, as 
opposed to criminal or civil sanctions—courts will evaluate the penalty 
pursuant to a balancing test so long as the penalized speech took place outside 
of the scope of employment.191  Where the allegedly leaked information is 
classified, however, courts and prosecutors have used that fact as a bootstrap 
to bypass Brandenburg, strict scrutiny, and even the more limited protections 
of the employee speech cases. 
B.  The Trouble with Bootstrapping in This Setting 
The problems with bootstrapping in this setting largely parallel the 
difficulties identified in the material-support context.  The treatment of 
classified leaks as categorically or nearly unprotected runs directly counter 
to major tenets of free speech theory—tenets that are widely embraced by 
courts in virtually all other relevant settings.  Courts and scholars ordinarily 
deem speech about national or international affairs, including national 
security, to lie at the very heart of the First Amendment and thus to deserve 
its highest protections.192  Also central to free speech theory are the belief 
that speech is a crucial check on those who govern us and the corollary 
wariness of government efforts to manipulate speech about itself.193  An 
executive power to determine via classification and prosecutorial choices 
which government information may and may not be shared legally is deeply 
antithetical to these precepts. 
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These theoretical insights are very much bolstered by the realities of the 
classification system.  The problem of rampant overclassification has been 
widely acknowledged by experts from across the political spectrum.194  For 
example, Erwin Griswold, who served as Richard Nixon’s solicitor general, 
deemed it “apparent to any person who has considerable experience with 
classified material that there is massive over-classification and that the 
principal concern of the classifiers is not with national security, but rather 
with governmental embarrassment of one sort or another.”195  Given 
classification’s ubiquity, leaks of classified information by government 
employees make up much of journalism’s lifeblood.196  More so, many leaks 
come from the very top—engineered by, or with the tacit approval of, the 
White House.197 
By treating classification decisions as bootstraps with which to yank 
classified leak prosecutions past the significant First Amendment protections 
that otherwise would apply, courts enable a dangerous level of executive 
branch control over speech.  This approach facilitates sweeping discretion by 
administrations to classify politically inconvenient information and to 
prosecute—as well as to deter through the threat of prosecution—those who 
might leak such information.  At the same time, administrations remain free 
to selectively leak or declassify information that casts them in a favorable 
light.  This scheme ignores basic lessons of free speech theory, lessons 
manifest elsewhere in free speech doctrine. 
This is by no means to say that classified information leaks warrant 
absolute protection.  Nor is it necessarily the case that the most rigorous 
doctrinal standards, such as the Brandenburg test, should apply without 
revision.  As I have explored elsewhere, a somewhat less rigorous test may 
be more appropriate for this context.198  Alternatively, a First Amendment 
“public accountability defense”—similar to one that Yochai Benkler has 
proposed as a legislative fix199—might be called for.  Yet by treating 
information’s classified status as fully or nearly determinative of a 
 
 194. See Kitrosser, supra note 167, at 426–28. 
 195. Erwin N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 1989), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1989/02/15/secrets-not-worth-
keeping/a115a154-4c6f-41fd-816a-112dd9908115 [https://perma.cc/95V8-GLVP]. 
 196. See, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats:  The Press 
and National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 236 (2008) (“Leaks of classified 
information, including classified national security information, have become one of the 
primary ways the government communicates information to the public.”); David E. Pozen, 
The Leaky Leviathan:  Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures 
of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 528–29 (2013) (citing the prevalence of leaked 
information in news stories). 
 197. See, e.g., William E. Lee, Deep Background:  Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of 
Leaking, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1469–70 (2008); Papandrea, supra note 196, at 251–52 
(describing the ubiquity of, and strategies behind, authorized leaks from the top); Pozen, supra 
note 196, at 529–30 (“Journalists and government insiders have consistently attested that 
leaking is far more common among those in leadership positions.”). 
 198. See Kitrosser, supra note 167, at 441; Kitrosser, supra note 164, at 1263–76. 
 199. See Yochai Benkler, A Public Accountability Defense for National Security Leakers 
and Whistleblowers, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 285–86 (2014) (supporting a statutory 
public accountability defense for leakers). 
2017] NATIONAL SECURITY BOOTSTRAPS 533 
prosecution’s constitutionality, courts fail to confront the competing interests 
at stake or to grapple with the range of possible doctrinal responses. 
CONCLUSION 
What is most interesting, and most troubling, about the cases explored here 
is not the extent to which they embrace judicial deference, but the indirect 
and unreflective route by which they arrive at this approach.  Much of the 
fuel for traversing this road comes from the administrative designations at 
issue in the cases and their impact on judicial perceptions of the very nature 
of the speech at issue.  In the material-support context, FTO status transforms 
coordinated speech into material support.200  In the classified-leaks setting, 
classification status transforms information into government property and its 
conveyance into something more akin to theft than to speech.201  With their 
perceptions of the underlying speech so shaped, courts shift their analytical 
orientation from deeply skeptical to highly deferential, while barely 
acknowledging either the speech values at stake or their opinions’ doctrinal 
novelty.202  The resulting judicial deference flies in the face of decades of 
hard-won lessons about the government’s tendency to overstate the national 
security risks of speech and transparency.  Yet even those who support the 
conclusions reached in these cases might agree that the courts have not 
adequately troubled themselves with their decisions’ impacts on free speech.  
One might protest that the courts ought to, at the very least, deliberate 
meaningfully about political branch measures to curtail deliberation, whether 
in the name of national security or otherwise. 
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